INTRODUCTION
Launch costs are one of the primary drivers impacting the total cost of commercial satellite space systems. The costs of fuel, manufacturing the engines, and launch site operations on average together exceed $100 million dollars. Launch costs alone often exceed the costs of the satellites themselves. One method used by commercial satellite providers to reduce launch costs of satellite systems is to attempt to maximize their existing launch capacity on each launch.
Previous approaches have increased launch capacity usage via secondary manifests, where the additional payload is physically separate from the primary payload. Examples include the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) Secondary Payload Adaptor (ESPA) and the secondary adapters on Minotaurs and Delta launchers. More recently, opportunities have arisen for payloads to "rideshare" on other satellites already traveling to space. The first example of this approach to space launch was the Internet Router in Space (IRIS) program being performed by Intelsat General and is currently being funded by the Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) branch of the Department of Defense (DoD).
Commercial communication satellite companies such as AGS, IntelSat, TeleSat, and Iridium have added or are working to add hosted payloads to their portfolio of products and services.
Because the Government faces the same cost pressures that commercial providers experience, can it also benefit from the commercial hosted payload concept? This paper describes the approach used for a "rideshare" with an experimental DoD infrared sensor under the CHIRP program. The paper analyzes how the Government and Contractor team(s) structured the CHIRP contract to mitigate both the actual and potential risks of this acquisition in particular and secondary hosted payloads in general.
The Evolution of DoD Space Launches
The United States DoD is widely regarded as having the most sophisticated space systems in the world such as the Global Positioning System (GPS), Milstar Satellite Communications System (Milstar), and the Defense Support Program (DSP). These systems support many military missions including reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence gathering, imaging, communication, navigation, weather mapping, and experimentation. For the past 50 years, the DoD has chauffeured these systems into space on rockets launched exclusively from U.S. soil.
However, as technology became more complex and mission requirements multiplied, the development of space systems slowed dramatically, with the average system taking up to 10 or more years to deploy. In fact, over the last two decades, most major programs have encountered significant cost overruns and schedule delays before being launched. These delays have cost the Government billions more than it anticipated and have resulted in possible national security gaps in mission coverage. In the case of CHIRP, as discussed in further detail below, the Government has benefited from significant cost savings using the hosted payload concept. In addition to the cost savings, the Government will benefit technically from the experiment by burning down risk questions (see Figure 4 ) and maturing technology for the 3GIRS objective system.
Most programs have seen costs grow in excess of 100% and many programs are behind schedule by seven or more years. Delays obviously diminish the future capabilities promised to the warfighter. Less obvious, and of greater concern, is where these delays result in a legacy system being relied on past its expected useful life. This inevitably leads to erosion in existing mission capabilities.
As obtained in the referenced Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on NPOESS, SBIRS, and DoD Major Weapon Programs, the chart below shows four key programs currently under development and the growth in their life cycle cost since the initial estimate of cost to the most recent estimate. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency program (AEHF) is a protected communication program that flies in geosynchronous earth orbit (GEO). The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is an operational environment satellite system designed to replace the current Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). SBIRS is a GEO and Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO) based system intended to replace DSP.
Figure 1 -Total Program Cost Growth vs. Recent Total Program Estimates
As the chart in Figure 1 shows, the SBIRS program costs have almost tripled since the program was approved in 1996. In addition to the cost increase, the requirements scope was reduced by two satellites, certain requirements were deferred into the future; and the program is years behind its original schedule. NPOESS has almost doubled in cost with fewer key sensors and two fewer satellites. It is possible that these programs could have benefited from a hosted payload technology utilization test early in the program development.
DoD Technology Maturation through Hosted Payloads:

Opportunities, Risks and Challenges
Both GAO reports referenced earlier cited insufficient technology testing as a problem in the development of the NPOESS and SBIRS. As such, there has been intense pressure on future space programs to undergo more rigorous, thorough technological maturation during the development cycle.
The 3GIRS system is the planned follow-on to SBIRS as the next-generation IR sensor program. As inferred above, the criticality of our nation's IR system necessitates a flight validation demonstration before the 3GIRS wide field of view (WFOV) staring technology can be confidently endorsed for the next-generation IR sensor space-based architecture. So, the issue becomes determining and selecting the most cost effective/efficient method for technology maturation.
As mentioned earlier, launch costs are one of the primary drivers impacting the total cost of satellite space systems and often exceed the costs of the satellites themselves. Commercial satellite providers try to maximize payloads to increase revenue, and hosting payloads helps them achieve this. However, due to national security concerns, International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) issues and funding and schedule constraints, DoD has long relied on less efficient and more costly space-based demonstrations utilizing dedicated military spacecraft or less effective ground-based demonstrations with simulated GEO scenes for its IR sensor testing. These concerns are by no means trivial or obsolete and often discourage Government programs to pursue the use of secondary payloads as a viable alternative.
However, in unique circumstances such as developmental testing or technology maturation, secondary hosted payloads may prove to be a feasible and successful alternative for IR sensor testing. As this paper will demonstrate, through early collaboration and deliberate planning and forethought to contract structure, many of the most critical risks and concerns can by mitigated if not avoided outright.
In January 2008, the Government received an unsolicited proposal submission for a "Commercially Hosted Infrared Figure 2 below provides the basic outline of the CHIRP Government and contractor team.
Figure 2 -CHIRP Program Team Flow Chart
The program was designed to follow commercial practices and to meet a commercial spacecraft schedule, which was already on-going before the program started. CHIRP is a full-service spaceflight technology demonstration comprised of the five elements (Launch Vehicle, Space Vehicle, Satellite Operations Center, CHIRP Mission Operations Center (CMOC), CHIRP Mission Analysis Center (CMAC)) as shown in the Figure 3 operating on Cband transponders for one-year of demonstration operations at commercial cost.
The CHIRP program is comprised of three sub-programs. The first sub-program is the spacecraft accommodation to the current host spacecraft. The other two sub-programs are the space and ground segment efforts managed by Orbital. Orbital is developing the secondary payload interface (SPI) between the host bus and the sensor. SAIC is developing the CHIRP sensor by modifying a 3GIRS-RR sensor quadrant. In addition, SAIC is developing the CMAC to process the space-acquired data obtained by the CMOC from the satellite after launch.
Because the SAIC sensor has a relatively small impact (weight, power, mass, thermal, etc), the need for extensive spacecraft bus modifications was reduced, thereby driving down overall cost and technical risk for the demonstration.
Figure 3 -CHIRP Program Five Elements
The Government conducted a cost benefit analysis of an AGS hosted payload versus Government owned and operated dedicated free flyer. The Government estimated a dedicated free flyer launched on an EELV would cost approximately $500 million and would satisfy 100% of the technical questions.
The AGS hosted payload, in comparison, would cost approximately $65 million and would satisfy 80% of the technical questions (see Figure 4 ) thus lending further credence to the overall cost effectiveness of a commercial host.
Figure 4 -Technical Questions of WFOV Systems
The Government completed an initial price analysis and independent cost estimate that provided a price analysis background, ground rules and assumptions, price results and comparison, and option-specific assumptions. The pricing team was tasked to provide a price analysis and independent cost estimate and compare that to the proposed commercially hosted payload concept. There were two scenario alternatives with variations used to conduct the price analysis. The first scenario was a hosted payload concept where the sensor payload would be integrated into an existing host spacecraft with associated ground assets. Two alternatives were priced within the hosted payload concept: the first was the use of an existing commercial communications satellite similar to the AGS concept; and the second was the use of an existing military spacecraft. The second price analysis scenario was a free flyer concept where the sensor payload would be integrated into a purchased or developed spacecraft with associated ground assets. Two alternatives were priced within the free flyer concept: the first was the purchase of a commercial spacecraft and integration of the sensor payload; and the second was the development of a custom spacecraft around the sensor payload.
The chart in Figure 5 below outlines the total price for the different scenarios without the commercially hosted payload estimate. Since the CHIRP contract was awarded at a total cost of $65 million, the chart clearly shows the significant savings the Government will receive from the using the hosted payload concept. Overall, the Government will save an additional 28% by using the AGS hosted payload option of $65 million. Hosting operational experiments on commercial spacecraft could significantly reduce the cycle time and cost of space product acquisitions. If cost and cycle time were reduced, it might rapidly enhance the technology maturation and risk reduction in a unique and innovative manner. Should the proposition of hosting demonstration payloads on commercial space assets prove successful, the Air Force could apply this operationally responsive paradigm to quickly integrate the latest technologies into space programs.
CONTRACTING METHODOLOGY
The most critical aspects of the contracting process for the hosted payload acquisition was the decision to use Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 12 vs. FAR Part 15, the approval of other than full and open competition, and the early, enthusiastic collaboration with the Contractor to craft a meaningful, flexible contract and the negotiation of the technical modifications necessary for a successful launch.
2.l The Decision for Far Part 12
Studies in the late 1980's revealed the Government paid a significant amount (upwards of 20%) for its excessive regulation and bureaucratic red tape associated with FAR 15-Contracting by Negotiation procurements. The commercial item revisions, codified at FAR 12-Acquisition of Commercial Items, were intended to provide relief and increase contract efficiencies. In fact, one of the most significant developments in federal acquisition reform in the 1990's was the expanded definition of a "commercial item". This resulted in the streamlining of typical (FAR 15) Government restrictions, certifications, clauses, and flowdown requirements, when a contract called for the acquisition of commercial supplies or services.
Using sound business judgment that is consistent with the law and the limits of its authority, the Air Force sought to take advantage of this aspect of procurement reform in order to reduce unnecessary contract risk and save money. FAR 12 makes intuitive sense with less onerous Government clauses and the ability to contract on normal commercial terms. With the exception of agreeing on unlimited data rights, the Government strayed very little from the standard FAR Part 12 clauses and did not require any of the standard FAR Part 15 clauses. This acquisition did not require many things such as the use of cost accounting standards, certified cost or pricing data, audit specialists, inspection clauses or compliance related requirements. Both the Government and the contractor sought to minimize the need for unnecessary and prohibitive requirements and certifications.
Other than Full and Open Competition
After the unsolicited proposal was received from AGS, the Government looked at spacecraft bus providers as well as commercial satellite providers for hosted payload and conducted internal research on both commercial and military launch dates, surplus payload capacity, known viable orbital slots, established frequency allocations, sufficient bandwidth, and US corporate status. Based on the findings by the Government, the only source with availability of an FY10 launch and a Continental United States (CONUS) orbital slot was AGS. As described in FAR 6.301(b) in order to proceed with a contract award without providing for full and open competition, the Government must reference a specific statutory authority allowing for the sole-source acquisition.
The statutory authority of 10 U.S.C. 2304 (c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(i) above was the appropriate and necessary authority for the AGS unsolicited proposal.
Consistent with FAR 6.302-1(a)(i)(A), the unsolicited proposal demonstrated a unique and innovative concept. It also demonstrated a unique capability of the source to provide the particular research services proposed.
Prior to AGS's submittal, the Government anticipated testing a WFOV IR sensor using a less effective groundbased demonstration with simulated GEO scenes or using a less efficient (more costly and longer timeline) space-based demonstration utilizing a dedicated military spacecraft. AGS's approach represented a shift from the traditional DoD technology demonstrations and experiments, which tended to use dedicated, DoD-procured satellite buses or ground-based demonstrations.
As stated earlier, the program office conducted its own internal research on both commercial and military launch dates, surplus payload capacity, known viable orbital slots, established frequency allocations, sufficient bandwidth, and U.S. corporate status. Based on these findings, the Government determined AGS was credibly the only source with availability of a launch and a CONUS orbital slot that met the Government's requirements.
In addition to the requirements outline above, the contracting officer was required to make a determination that the anticipated cost to the Government would be fair and reasonable. As explained in Section 1.2 above, the Government performed a preliminary price analysis. Although the FAR does not require detailed cost data for a FFP, commercial acquisition (FAR 15.403-1 (b)(3)), the Government cost team began constructing a cost model to assist with fact-finding. The cost model was able to take into account the estimated payload to spacecraft integration costs, the impact to the spacecraft lifetime and potential loss of business opportunity to the commercial satellite (COMSAT) provider. The Government compared the price/value of the AGS hosted payload with the price/value of a Government owned and operated dedicated free flyer and determined that the Government would experience a significant price/value savings from awarding the CHIRP contract and that the price was fair and reasonable. Although the nature of this hosted payload acquisition supported the criteria for an unsolicited proposal and solesource acquisition, future hosted payload opportunities may not share similar characteristics. They will require a full and open competition because there are additional commercial COMSAT providers that can potentially offer hosted payload capabilities.
Early Collaborative Contracting: Unique Contractual Agreements
Like any acquisition, a hosted payload is most successful when all parties seek to minimize the need for unnecessary and prohibitive requirements and certifications and focus on the "win-win" scenario. In the case of the 3GIRS experiment (CHIRP), the contractor's negotiation focused on the desire to be the first commercial contractor to host a DoD payload. Likewise, the Government simplified its focus to getting "good data down-linked". The parties' straightforward goals facilitated a quicker, stronger "meeting of the minds".
The following list highlights some of the more significant areas of potential conflict-minimized through early collaboration and critical forethought and prudence. Although these areas are germane to CHIRP, their relevance could extend to any developmental hosted payload.
Continuing Resolution-In the event of a congressional continuing resolution, the Government would make best efforts to obligate funds in accordance with the agreed to commercial payment schedule--to include the events-based incentive payments. Upon release of current year funds, the Government would obligate monies against any unfunded contract commitments.
Although both parties negotiated in good faith, this clause became necessary to solidify the Government's firm intent to honor the terms and conditions of the contract regardless of future contractor/Government teams and/or political circumstances.
Data Rights-In order to expedite contract award, the contractor accepted the Government's requirement for unlimited data rights. However, the Government did consent to a one month window from the date of contract award in which the contractor could submit a list of exceptions to unlimited data rights.
Final approval authority for any exceptions would be at the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) level.
In accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract, the contractor submitted a list of exceptions to unlimited data rights prior to expiration of the one month window. The Government conducted an extensive review and ultimately determined the proposed exceptions were acceptable since the requested exceptions pertained to items the contractor (and respective subcontractors) had developed under private expense or was confidential/proprietary technical data.
Shared Risk-The Government and contractor mutually agreed upon a clause to share the risk and responsibility in the event the initial launch window of May to September 2010 were missed. Both parties agreed the failure to meet the scheduled CHIRP launch shall be at "no fault" to the contractor team or Government. The clause mitigates the contractor's financial responsibility and limits the Government's liability to those costs directly associated with the actual transfer of the CHIRP from the original spacecraft to the next feasible launch.
In the event of a missed initial launch or in the event a collective decision is made to forego the launch, the contractor will submit an engineering change proposal (ECP) for costs associated with the transfer of the CHIRP and integration with the new spacecraft in the next earliest feasible launch scenario. Both parties agreed the final cost for the alternate launch would include the current market price for transponder usage at the orbital location. Additionally, in the event of a missed initial launch, the contractor shall not receive the event-based payment tied to a successful launch.
This clause was essential for the CHIRP and should be considered in any hosted payload since secondary payloads have little if any influence or priority on launch schedules. It (the clause) refocuses the contractor and Government team on the underlying objective of getting the program back on track. Costly negotiations, arbitration and even litigation are avoided to protect the best interests of the program.
Government Furnished Property-The Government team created a comprehensive document containing all items to be furnished by the Government with corresponding pertinent information. Previous experience dictated future team members would need clear, concise contact information to ensure up to date monitoring of all deliverables to avoid any Government caused delays.
Termination Liability-With regards to termination liability, 232.705-70 "Limitation of Government's Obligation" states that in the event of a termination for convenience the contractor shall not receive a sum greater than the payments made to the date of the termination of convenience notification and that all costs incurred and any additional settlement costs shall not exceed the sum of all payments up to the termination for convenience effective date.
Payment structure-The payment schedule for the CHIRP program is a mutually agreed to 80/20 split for commercial payments and event based incentive payments. The commercial payments and event-based incentive payments are directly tied to the Government's budget for the CHIRP program and are tied to Government approved Contract Data Requirement List (CDRL) submittals and deliverables. Figure 6 shows the structure of the payment schedule in the contract without the dollar amounts for each payment since this information is proprietary to AGS. By tying the payments to approval of the CDRLs, the Contract Line Item (CLIN) structure was streamlined and the overall contract became more simplified and focused. 
Technical Modifications Unique to CHIRP
Although the CHIRP began as an unsolicited proposal, the Government team benefited contractually and technically from early collaboration. Working together during their technical exchanges, the Government and contractor teams focused on areas unforeseen albeit necessary for a successful launch. The following areas are critical for Government security requirements and payload-specific operation and continue to be evaluated by the Government and contractor teams at this time.
Launch Locks and Release Mechanism-Launch locks and release mechanisms were not detailed in the proposal, however they were considered necessary and implicit in the design of the hosted payload support deck (HPSD) and are required to provide sensor stability during launch. The launch locks are released after launch operations. Additionally, the HPSD accommodates harness constraints and thermal constraints by minimizing the harness mass by utilizing space underneath the HPSD, and allows the Electronic Control Module (ECM) to be directly mounted to North Payload Extension Panel for thermal distribution.
The launch locks are a one time release mechanism that will be deployed during initial sensor checkout, which occurs in the first 30 days post launch. The launch locks were incorporated into the design for two distinct purposes: the first was the aforementioned stability requirement for the sensor during launch; and the second was to allow for a sufficient thermal environment for the optical bench and sensor. In light of the importance of these locks to mission success, a study was performed by the AGS team to evaluate flight heritage, part failure rates, and parts availability from available vendors. Upon completion, it was decided to use four TINI launch locks, which have flight heritage, and have successfully flown on other SAIC flight programs.
On-Board Data Storage-The on-board data storage will be added to the sensor electronics. The addition of this unit to the sensor allows for collection of IR data during off-axis calibration and transponder off functionality when CHIRP is not transmitting to the ground station. The unit would nominally add 500 grams of mass, and have a 64 Gb storage capacity the inclusion of this on-board storage was considered necessary and implicit in the sensor design. The memory module chosen was a commercial off the shelf (COTS) AITECH 64 GB NAND flash memory module. The module was chosen because of it's greater than 45 MB/sec transfer rate, low power consumption, and ruggedness to withstand high vibration and shock environments.
Thermal Enclosure-A baseline change to the thermal enclosure was needed in order to mitigate the hot radiative environment of the nadir deck or the earth facing deck. Additionally, a 5-mil silver Teflon was chosen for low mass, Kinematic Mounts on top of T-300 struts were chosen to minimize heat leak into bench, and G-10 Flexures to conductively and structurally decouple the compressors from the bench (See Figure 7 below ).
Figure 7 -CHIRP Thermal Enclosure Baseline
Baffle Cover and Release Mechanism-The baffle cover (See Figure 8 below) was developed for the Near Earth Mapping Observatory (NEMO) and built to flight standards. The baffle cover is necessary to minimize the risk of sensor inoperability due to contamination that would occur from the launch environment. Although this baffle cover has never flown, the Naval Research Lab exhaustively tested the baffle cover and release for 1000+ functional cycles and vibration testing sequences. The baffle cover and release have a mass of 2 kg and is equipped with redundant actuators to mitigate single point failure. A trade was conducted by AGS and the Government team to determine whether the contamination due to launch on an Arianne rocket could contaminate the staring sensor. The result of that trade was that there was insufficient data on Arianne fairings or on the other satellite that will reside above the AGS satellite in the launch configuration.
As a precautionary measure, the baffle cover was included in the baseline configuration of the CHIRP system. 
OPERATIONAL TRADE-OFFS
Even though hosted payloads represent the "cheaper" alternative for launches, the DoD has been reluctant to use secondary payloads outside of communication satellitesand for good reason. No analysis would be complete without an objective discussion of the real tradeoffs a Government program must consider between primary vs. secondary payloads. Although not comprehensive, the following discussion captures some of the most critical tradeoffs faced by CHIRP. Again, the Government believes these tradeoffs to be applicable to most other Government hosted payloads as well.
Because of the developmental nature of the payload and the flexible contract structure, the 3GIRS sensor is a program conducive to being a secondary payload. Nonetheless, many of the issues detailed below represent critical risk areas for some programs that cannot be adequately mitigated or avoided and thus may be ill-suited to be secondary payloads.
Launch window certainty/required launch date-Free Flyer launches are typically scheduled 18 months in advance.
Commercially hosted launch opportunities cannot and will not wait, nor is the launch window guaranteed. Additionally, largely driven by commercial revenue, the business case could drive, delay, or move the launch to unknown future times for any number of reasons.
The launch negotiated for CHIRP was scheduled for the summer launch cycle of 2010 from a launch location outside of CONUS. The May launch date could be affected by circumstances beyond the control of the contractor (e.g. natural disasters, political instability) and could be moved anytime within a six month launch window during the summer launch cycle. Once successfully launched, the CHIRP testing operations will commence for a period of 12 months.
Orbit certainty-With a free flyer launch, orbits are guaranteed. However, as a hosted payload, if the owner of the payload (primary payload) determines a different orbital position than the initial one is required, there is little if anything the owner of the secondary payload can do except decide if the new orbit is acceptable. CHIRP encountered this problem prior to award.
Figure 9 -CHIRP view from Orbital Slot
Between proposal and contract award, AGS (the payload owner) made the decision to relocate the baseline satellite location from 79 degrees (see Figure 9 below) to 103 degrees due to market factors outside AGS or the Government's ability to control.
Parasitic Effect/Weight-The lost opportunity costs the contractor would experience under the hosted payload program pertain to an increase in weight of the satellite due to the addition of the WFOV sensor. The extra weight of the WFOV sensor will increase the weight of the satellite, which leads to a decrease in fuel capacity and causes a decrease in mean mission duration, also known as the predicted duration of a satellite.
The Government negotiated an increase in contract price due to lost opportunity costs that the contractor would not typically experience in the commercial sector and additional Government requirements regarding Government Furnished Property (GFP). The additional mass of the CHIRP sensor and assembly requires a reduction of fuel to offset it. This reduced the expected lifetime of the spacecraft by approximately 1 year/33kg. At a baseline 105kg this equates to approximately 3 years of lost spacecraft usage. In addition, hosting military payloads on commercial satellite systems requires a great deal of sensitivity to the perception of foreign nations and stakeholders. Many of the commercial satellite companies are global entities and use launch sites outside of the U.S. The U.S. Government must take the appropriate steps to communicate the nature of the hosted military payload in a transparent fashion through Government-to-Government interaction. This can be accomplished by identifying the nations and stakeholders that may be directly or indirectly involved, identifying the appropriate bureaus in those foreign nations, identifying the level of transparency that will be permissible, sharing data from the hosted payload, and meeting and establishing relationships through proper Government channels.
Security Considerations-In the case of CHIRP where a foreign launch will be used, it is necessary to consider the various security planning considerations and requirements in order for successful program completion. Some of the standard security conditions generated from an Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) launch include no unauthorized access to the U.S. satellite or to any U.S. controlled equipment or technical date related to the launch. Since U.S. Government COMSEC equipment is exported, a separate cryptographic security plan that identifies security protection procedures must be submitted to the NSA. Lastly, the requirement for a Technology Transfer Control Plan (TTCP) and associated security plans must be approved by the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA).
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
From its inception as a sole source unsolicited proposal, the CHIRP acquisition represents a pivotal decision for the Air Force in how it may continue to test its IR sensors in the future. Although using commercial satellites represents significant cost savings to the Government, program managers must consider and evaluate the very real tradeoffs inherent with secondary vs. primary payloads. The Government team advocates early collaboration with the contractor, flexible contracts and a clear understanding and articulation of the technical requirements of a DoD hosted payload to better posture the acquisition for success.
CHIRP is a critical first step towards validating the feasibility and successfulness of using commercially hosted payloads within the development and operational testing niche of Government space programs. Even with the successful launch and test of CHIRP, additional research is necessary to advocate commercial secondary payloads conclusively. The Government team is confident that commercially hosted platforms offer a new paradigm to early payload technology maturation and risk reduction.
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